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NEW BULLY ON THE CLASS ACTION BLOCK-
ANALYSIS OF RESTRICTIONS ON SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS IMPOSED BY THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 Congress perceived a growing threat to the nation's capi-
tal markets from the numerous frivolous lawsuits against corporations
under federal securities laws. Congress was especially concerned
about collusion between plaintiffs' law firms and the so-called "profes-
sional plaintiffs"' that often led to settlements favoring the law firms at
the expense of the class members.
2
To combat the perceived abuses, Congress, on December 22,
1995, over President Clinton's veto, enacted the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA" or "Act").3 The innovations
found in the Act include a complete overhaul of the securities fraud
class actions. On top of the regular requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 4 the PSLRA imposes an additional layer of restric-
tions applicable exclusively to the federal securities laws violations,
completely changing the field of federal securities class actions.
This Note examines the procedural changes that most affect se-
curities class actions and analyzes the difficulties that have already
arisen or might arise before the courts interpreting the new rules. It
also suggests how experience gathered in the application of the
1 The term "professional plaintiffi" refers to individuals who owned only small
interests in many different companies and were willing to lend their names to the
securities class actions in exchange for an extra payment upon settlement. Some of
these individuals figured as class representative in a number of cases. See S. REP. No.
104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685.
2 Seeid.
3 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in different sections of 15
U.S.C.).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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PSLRA class action provisions can be used to improve the whole of the
class action scheme under the Federal Rules.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND ENACTMENT
The PSLRA represents the first substantial reform of the federal
securities laws since the sweeping New Deal legislation. 5 It received
major support from the lobbying efforts of accountants, securities
firms, and the high-tech industry, who were hardest hit by the harass-
ing lawsuits. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also
was very concerned with the voluminous filings of frivolous securities
class actions and advocated changes in the procedural rules. Thus,
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in his congressional testimony spoke in
favor of the revision of the rules governing securities class actions "be-
cause private litigation imposes substantial unnecessary costs when it
is abused by private plaintiffs or their attorneys."'6 The Senate report
stated:
Under the current system, the initiative for filing [securities fraud]
suits comes almost entirely from lawyers, not from genuine inves-
tors. Lawyers typically rely on repeat, or "professional," plaintiffs
who, because they own a token number of shares in many compa-
nies, regularly lend their names to lawsuits. Even worse, investors in
the class usually have great difficulty exercising any meaningful di-
rection over the case brought on their behalf. The lawyers can de-
cide when to sue and when to settle, based largely on their own
financial interests, not the interests of their purported clients.
7
Congress, through the PSLRA, effected a number of reforms designed
to prevent frivolous lawsuits from being filed and to discourage attor-
neys from engaging in the offensive practices. These revisions are
both substantive and procedural. Substantive rights changed by the
PSLRA include the requirement that plaintiffs plead scienter with par-
ticularity,s a provision extending the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements, 9 a limitation on damages,' 0 and the elimination of joint
and several liability for violations charged under theories of reckless-
5 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-eee (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
6 Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings on S. 240 Before the Subcommittee on Tele-
communications and Finance, of the House Committee on Commerce, 104th Cong. 196 (1995)
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
7 S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685.
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. 111996). Although this change is procedural,
it has a disproportionately significant bearing on the substantive rights.
9 See id. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
10 See id. § 78u-4(e).
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ness, negligence, or strict liability in favor of a proportionate liability
scheme." As for the procedural changes, the most significant of
them involve the already mentioned heightened pleading standards
12
and the complete revision of the rules governing securities class ac-
tions. The class action changes include:
(i) A requirement that a class action law firm that is the first to
file the complaint carry the burden of providing notice to prospective
class members without any assurance of ultimately becoming the lead
counsel. (Before the Act, a class action law firm could become class
counsel in most cases by being the first to the courthouse.)
(ii) A requirement that the court presume that the shareholder
with the largest financial interest in the outcome is the most adequate
representative of the class and appoint such shareholder the lead
plaintiff'13 The Act also limits the ability of a party to serve as lead
plaintiff to five class actions brought within any three year period
14
and provides that the lead plaintiff can collect only his pro-rata share
of recovery. 15
(iii) A limitation of attorneys' fees to a reasonable percentage of
the class recovery.'
6
(iv) A restriction on the filing of settlements under seal.' 7 The
Act creates a presumption against filing settlements under seal.
(v) A requirement that notice of the settlement must be given to
class members, detailing: (1) the average amount of recoverable dam-
ages per share; (2) an explanation of the attorneys' fees and costs
sought; (3) the address and telephone number for class counsel; and
(4) the reason for the proposed settlement.' 8
The Act also includes a number of other procedural changes
designed to discourage filings of harassing lawsuits and to make it im-
possible to sustain them.19
11 See id. § 7 8u-4(g).
12 Before the Act, dismissal of a complaint in many courts was difficult to achieve
because scienter could be alleged generally. The Act requires that the complaint con-
tain allegations "stat[ing) with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind." Id. § 78u-4(b) (2).
13 See id. §§ 77z-1 (3) (B), 78u-4(3) (B).
14 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (vi), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (vi).
15 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (4), 78u-4(a) (4).
16 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (6), 78u-4(a) (6).
17 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (5), 78u-4(a) (5).
18 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7), 78u-4(a) (7).
19 Among these changes are:
(i) A requirement that the court stay all discovery pending a motion to dismiss
except where discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue preju-
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IIl. ANALYSIS OF THE PSLRA PROVISIONs AFFECTING CLASs ACTIONS2 0
Because Congress sought, in enacting the PSLRA, to address the
problem of frivolous class action lawsuits, 21 it devoted significant at-
tention to the means of eliminating the incentives fueling the abuse
and of making it extremely hard to bring meritless securities class ac-
tions. Whereas prior to the Act securities class actions, as any other
class actions, were governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Act provides for several additional requirements.
The first group of requirements under the Act affects the deter-
mination of the most adequate plaintiff and encourages institutional
investors to apply for this position,22 while the second sets out to em-
power the class members by providing them with better information
from the early inception of the litigation so that they can make in-
formed decisions regarding the action. Even before these provisions
take effect, however, plaintiffs have to comply with initial notice and
certification requirements of the Act.
A. Certification and Early Notice Requirements: Punishing the Initiative?
1. Introduction
Under the Act, each plaintiff seeking to represent the class shall
file along with the complaint a sworn certification that states, in effect,
that the plaintiff is not acting at the behest of the counsel, is familiar
dice. (Before the Act, most courts would not stay discovery pending a motion to dis-
miss.) Id. §§ 77z-1 (b), 78u4(b) (3);
(ii) A requirement that the court make specific findings at the conclusion of the
case as to whether Rule 11 requirements were met. If the court concludes that a party
violated Rule 11, it must impose sanctions. (Before the Act, imposition of the Rule 11
sanctions for bringing a frivolous lawsuit was within the discretion of the court.) The
Act creates a presumption that an appropriate Rule 11 sanction is an award of attor-
neys' fees and costs of the action. See id. §§ 77z-1 (c), 78u4(c). To ensure payment of
a Rule 11 sanction award, the Act authorizes the court to require the plaintiff to post a
bond. See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (8), 78u4(a) (8);
(iii) An elimination of the violations of the federal securities laws as one of the
predicate offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). RICO has been amended to preclude its use in securities fraud actions. 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 111996). For a good discussion of the implications of
the Act for the RICO statute, see G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on
Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning And Impact On Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting
And Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. C~iM. L. REV. 1345, 1676-1702 (1996).
20 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a), 78u-4(a) (Supp. 111996).
21 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 733.
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with the subject matter of the complaint, and has authorized initiation
of the action. 23 The statement should state plaintiff's willingness to
serve as a representative party for the class and a promise that plaintiff
will not accept any payment for serving in that capacity.24 It should
also contain information about plaintiff's transactions in the security
that is at issue in the litigation and should identify any action in the
preceding three years where plaintiff sought to serve or served as class
representative.25 By imposing these restrictions Congress sought to
erect impenetrable barriers for the "professional plaintiffs" and to
take control of the litigation away from the unscrupulous attorneys. 26
As one court put it, "Congress sought to eliminate figurehead plain-
tiffs who exercise no meaningful supervision of litigation."
27
2. Analysis
Under the Act, once the complaint is filed and a certification by
the original plaintiff attached, other investors moving the court to be
appointed lead plaintiffs do not have to file analogous certifications.28
The problem with this provision is that it puts the party that files the
complaint at a disadvantage with respect to those who seek appoint-
ment as lead plaintiffs at a later date, especially in light of the limita-
tion on discovery relating to the adequacy of class representation. 29
By filing first, the plaintiff seeking to represent the class has to make
disclosures that the parties challenging the movant for the same posi-
tion do not have to make.30 In addition to the certification, the first
23 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a) (2), 78u-4(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.G.G.A.N.
730, 732.
27 Ravens v. Iftikar, No. G-96-1224-VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10361, at *20
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 1997).
28 See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 61 (D. Mass. 1996) (explain-
ing that extension of the certification requirement to purported class members mov-
ing to become lead plaintiffs would not serve the congressional purpose of
eliminating the use of professional plaintiffs).
29 The Act provides in relevant part:
iv. Discovery. For purposes of this subparagraph, discovery relating to
whether a member or members of the purported plaintiff class is the most
adequate plaintiff may be conducted by a plaintiff only if a plaintifffirst dem-
onstrates a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the class.
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iv), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iv) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
30 Presumably, class members seeking lead plaintiff appointment would make
certain disclosures in order to persuade the court that they are the most adequate for
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plaintiff also has to provide initial notice to the members of the pur-
ported class about the pendency of the action.3 ' Inadequacy of such
notice, either substantive (content) or procedural (form, medium of
communication, scope, etc.), also might jeopardize the plaintiffs bid
to be appointed class representative.
3 2
Moreover, the Act does not specifically provide for a scheme to
compensate the expenses associated with filing the complaint on be-
half of the class or providing the initial notice to the class. Although
the Act's provision dealing with the plaintiff s recovery states that
"[n] othing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the award of
reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating
to the representation of the class to any representative party serving on
behalf of the class,"'33 it is unclear whether the courts will allow the party
that first filed the lawsuit on behalf of the class to collect under this
provision if that party is not later deemed the class representative. In
addition, it is unclear whether the sum of money expended by the
initial plaintiff on giving notice, that the court ultimately finds inade-
quate, is a "reasonable" expense.
The issue of compensating the first plaintiff and his or her coun-
sel for their initial services takes on an added dimension in light of the
numerous initial complaints in different jurisdictions advancing dif-
ferent recovery theories or class periods but arising out of the same
underlying conduct of the defendant. Given the prohibition on the
duplication of attorneys' fees, the first plaintiff (or plaintiffs) could
not recover the money expended on drafting the complaint and pro-
viding the initial notice. At the time of the initial filing the plaintiff is
unaware about how many claims (if any) against the defendant will be
filed by other class members. In the face of the substantial expendi-
tures that might not be compensable, the aggrieved persons are thus
discouraged from initiating securities class actions.
the job. As Greebel indicates, however, their disclosures do not have to be as extensive
as those required of the "initial" plaintiff.
31 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (A) (i), 78u-4(a) (3) (A) (i) (Supp. II 1996).
32 See, e.g., Ravens, supra note 27, at *3-4 ("Notice is a prerequisite to designation
of a 'most adequate' or lead plaintiff.... [Notice defects bar] designation of a lead
plaintiff, at least until further proceedings."); Lax v. First Merchant Acceptance Corp.,
No. 97-C-2716, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12432 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997) (involving one
group of investors seeking appointment as lead plaintiff that challenged adequacy of
the notice provided by another group of investors seeking the same); see also Richard
Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARiz. L.
REv. 641, 652-53 (1997) (poiriting out that "[t]he limited returns suggest that the
notice provision does create an obstacle to securing lead plaintiff status by the first
plaintiff to file.. ").
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (4), 78u-4(a) (4) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
[VOL- 73:41140
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3. Conclusion
In light of the hazards and expenses associated with being the
first one to file, it seems that, as a matter of strategy, a party that con-
templates bringing a securities fraud class action might want to delay
filing its complaint until after another class member files first. Then,
it should file a motion challenging the adequacy of the initial plaintiff
and the initial notice and ask to be appointed lead plaintiff. If this
party has a significant financial stake in the outcome of the litigation,
it may, subject to the availability of other seekers with a substantial
interest, have a better chance (and lesser expense) to be appointed
lead plaintiff than if it had been the first to file. If the party does not
succeed in its bid, it may be able to opt out of the class at a later date
to pursue its own action. At least, it would have saved the expense
associated with providing initial notice.
This strategy, of course, would benefit only the parties with rela-
tively significant interests. As for the shareholders with small stakes in
the outcome that have traditionally supplied professional plaintiffs,
the small size of their interest effectively precludes them from utilizing
this strategy of filing first, given the costs of drafting the complaint
and providing the initial notice and the near-certainty that they will
not become lead plaintiffs.
Even though strategic considerations might encourage a party
with a substantial interest to delay its filing, the very fact that the
party's interest is significant guarantees that the securities fraud will
not go unpunished and that the party will come forward and sue the
offender in the absence of other plaintiffs. Since the statute of limita-
tions in securities fraud actions is relatively short,3 4 the risk of "losing"
important evidence is not very high.3 5 Moreover, the party will have
34 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrowv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)
(declaring that the statute of limitations for a private securities fraud cause of action is
one year from the time of discovery of the fraud and at most three years from the date
of the alleged violation).
35 It should be remembered, of course, that the notice provision, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (A), 78u-4(a) (3) (A) (Supp. II 1996) and the choice of the most ade-
quate plaintiff provision, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (Supp. II
1996), coupled with the delay necessary to dispose of the motion to dismiss, push
back the beginning of discovery even further. See, e.g., Sherrie R. Savett, The Merits
Matter Most And Observations On A Changing Landscape Under the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, 39 Aiz. L. REv. 525, 531 (1997) ("The court's decision time on
a motion to dismiss is uncertain, but even if ajudge decides in one month, it will be a
minimum of nine months from the filing of the complaint before discovery can even
start."). Yet, once a lawsuit is filed, "any party to the action with actual notice of the
allegations contained in the complaint" has an affirmative duty to preserve evidence
"as if [it] were the subject of continuing request for production of documents from
1998] 1141
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more time to conduct an independent investigation into the merits of
the case and to make a better judgment on whether to bring it or not.
Additional time also means a better drafted complaint.
Overall, certification and initial notice provisions of the Act serve
well the congressional intent of discouraging the race to the court-
house,'3 6 even though they have a tendency to "punish the initiative."
Along with other provisions of the Act, they have played a significant
role in curbing the filing of frivolous securities class actions.37 They
may also serve as a valuable base for any future Rule 23 reform.
B. Most Adequate Plaintiff Provisions
1. Introduction
The lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA3s were specifically
crafted to address the problems caused by the attorneys initiating and
conducting the litigation without much control from the class mem-
bers.39 To deal with such abuses, Congress, relying on the proposals
expressed by Professors Weiss and Beckerman in a law journal arti-
cle,40 provided a scheme designed to give the lead plaintiff, preferably
an institutional investor, more incentive to supervise the class coun-
sel's behavior. Weiss and Beckerman believed, and Congress agreed,
that institutional investors with large stakes in the outcome of the liti-
an opposing party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-
1 (b) (1), 78u4(b) (3) (B) (Supp. I 1996).
As for preservation of the evidence in possession of third parties, at least one
court has agreed to lift an absolute stay on discovery to allow the plaintiff to serve, but
not to enforce, subpoenas duces tecum on non-party third persons. See In re Grand
Casinos, Inc., Securities Litigation, No. 4-96-890 (JRT/RLE), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18938 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 1997). But see Asset Value Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Find/
SVP, Inc., No. Civ.A.97-3977 (LAK), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14304 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,
1997).
36 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 732.
37 See Savett, supra note 35, at 528-29 (citing the NERA (National Research Asso-
ciates, Inc.) study indicating that in 1996 the average suit was filed sixty-three days
after the decline in a company's stock, as opposed to the average of forty-nine days
during the same period in 1995).
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (Supp. II 1996).
39 See Elliott J. Weiss, Comment: The Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 561, 563 (1997) (citing S. RP.
No. 104-98, at 11 (1995) and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995)).
40 ElliottJ. Weiss &John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Insti-
tutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE LJ. 2053
(1995); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 690 n.32.
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gation would be likely to monitor the attorneys more effectively and
would be more articulate in defending the interests of the class vis-a-
vis class counsel.
41
Insofar as the most adequate plaintiff provisions go beyond the
pre-existing lead plaintiff requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 42 they appear to come in conflict with the established
rules and undermine the uniformity of the federal judicial system.
43
These provisions also have had an unexpected consequence of gener-
ating satellite litigation between different plaintiffs vying to become
lead plaintiffs.44 Judicial interpretation of these provisions has already
proven to lack uniformity.
2. Analysis
a. Presumed Adequate Until Proven Guilty
After the complaint accompanied by the certification is filed and
the preliminary notice is disseminated to the class members, the Act
allows any interested class member to file a motion to be appointed
lead plaintiff.45 In most of the securities class actions brought after
the Act, several plaintiffs have squared off against each other to obtain
this sought-after position. Therefore, the first challenge class mem-
bers have to face comes from within their own midst rather than from
the opposing party.46 Interestingly enough, the appointment by the
court of the most adequate plaintiff does not prejudice defendant's
ability to challenge this appointment during the class certification
hearing,47 even though the court would have already made a determi-
41 SeeWeiss & Beckerman, supra note 40, at 2105-07; see also S. RaP. No. 104-98, at
11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 690.
42 SeeFED. 1 Crv. P.23(a).
43 See generally Vincent R. Capucci, Conflict Between Rule 23 and Securities Reform Act,
N.Y. LJ., Apr. 2, 1996, at 1 (discussing the inconsistencies between Rule 23 and poten-
tial appointment of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs).
44 See SEC, REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE
UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFoRM ACT OF 1995, at 43 (1997).
45 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (i), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (Supp. II 1996).
46 Although the defendant is not usually involved in challenging the adequacy or
typicality of a potential lead plaintiff at this stage, at least one court has granted a
defendant standing to challenge the adequacy of the initial notice to the class, given
the importance of such notice to the very maintenance of the class action. See
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Mass. 1996).
47 See Greeb4e 939 F. Supp. at 60 (citing legislative history); see also Gluck v. Cellstar
Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 545 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Lax v. First Merchants Acceptance
Corp., supra note 32. Nevertheless a case may be made that because the statute is not
dispositive on its face, defensive collateral estoppel should apply on the issue of ade-
quacy of representation.
1998] 1143
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nation whether the plaintiff satisfies Rule 23 (a) requirements. 48 Po-
tentially, this provision subjects the class representative to the expense
of litigating the issue of its adequacy twice-first against other class
members vying for the same position, and then against the defendant
at the class certification stage. Although this result might be in line
with the congressional intent of discouraging frivolous lawsuits by
making it less attractive for a person to sue for securities fraud, this
double-expense seems inherently unfair and may potentially discour-
age a number of meritorious claims.
b. Selecting the Most Adequate Plaintiff
The Act mandates that the court considering the appointment of
the lead plaintiff presume that the most adequate plaintiff is the per-
son or a group of persons that:
(1) either filed a complaint or filed a motion to be appointed
lead plaintiff;
(2) in determination of the court, has the largest financial in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation; and
(3) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
49
Traditionally, the courts sitting in class actions allow a defendant standing to
challenge the adequacy of the lead plaintiff as best available surrogates. See Greebel
939 F. Supp. at 60 (citing Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 40, at 2101). With other
members of the plaintiff's class mounting the challenge, however, the defendant's
"services" should no longer be required in this matter. Insofar as a defendant pur-
ports to represent the interests of the absent class members when it challenges the
lead plaintiff's adequacy, it is in privity of interest with the class members who had
already unsuccessfully challenged the lead plaintiff on the same grounds. It is doubt-
ful that the defendant will have better information about the lead plaintiffs adequacy
than the other class members who challenged the lead plaintiffs adequacy at an ear-
lier stage. Just like the defendant, the class members challenging the lead plaintiffs
adequacy would be able to obtain discovery of the plaintiff relating to the plaintiffs
adequacy, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iv), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iv) (Supp. II
1996).
If the lead plaintiffs compliance with Rule 23(a) requirements had been unsuc-
cessfully challenged by other class members, allowing the defendant to challenge the
same would only result in judicial waste and would subject the lead plaintiff to addi-
tional unnecessary expense. The defendant should be allowed to challenge the lead
plaintiffs adequacy only if the issue had not been previously adversely litigated and
resolved, or if the discovery reveals new information that puts the plaintiffs adequacy
in doubt.
48 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (I) (i) (cc), 78u4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (I) (i) (cc)
(Supp. II 1996).
49 Id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (I), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (I).
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Members of the plaintiff class may attempt to refute the presumption
in favor of the plaintiff with the largest financial interest by establish-
ing that such plaintiff "will not fairly and adequately represent the
class" or "is subject to unique defenses."50 If the challenger demon-
strates a "reasonable basis" for a finding of the plaintiffs inadequacy,
the challenger may obtain discovery of that plaintiff.51 It is unclear
what the threshold for the "reasonable basis" is and whether it will be
possible for a party to pass this muster without any discovery at all.
The courts will have a lot of leeway in interpreting this provision.
The most adequate plaintiff selected by the court chooses, subject
to court's approval, the counsel for the class.52 So long as there is no
duplication of attorneys' services and no increase of the cost to the
class, the most adequate plaintiff may select more than one law firm to
50 Id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (II), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (II).
51 See id. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(iv), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv).
52 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (v), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v). At least one court has re-
quired the submission of bids from the law firms representing the investors seeking
lead plaintiff positions prior to the ruling on who the most adequate plaintiff is. See
Raftery v. Mercury Fin. Co. (In re Mercury Fin. Co. Litigation), No. 97-C-624, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12439 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997). The court indicated that the pro-
posed class counsel's compensation should figure as one of the variables in the
formula for determining most adequate plaintiff and may be an important enough
factor to rebut the statutory presumption of adequacy. See id. at *10.
Although the court's concern with the class's well-being is highly commendable,
its ruling is in conflict with the plain language of the statute. The Act presupposes
that court's appointment of lead plaintiff precedes the choice of the law firm to repre-
sent the class. To allow the court to consider potential compensation of the counsel
as a factor in determining who the most adequate plaintiff is would leave the provi-
sion of the Act that allows the most adequate plaintiff to select class counsel, subject to
court's approval a mere surplusage. The court would have already given the approval
to class counsel at the time of selecting most adequate plaintiff.
The goal of the Raflery court may be served, however, at a later date when the
most adequate plaintiff presents its choice of class counsel to the court. When a class
member submits a motion for appointment of class counsel contemporaneously with
the motion to be appointed lead plaintiff, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the
court from appointing that investor most adequate plaintiff while at the same time
denying its motion for appointment of the counsel. Moreover, attorneys' fees and
expenses are subject to the court's approval anyway pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-
I(a) (6), 78u-4(a) (6) (Supp. II 1996).
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serve as co-lead counsel.53 Most courts also allow several investors or
groups of investors to be appointed co-lead plaintiffs.
54
The PSLRA does not specify how the court should determine who
has the largest financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. The
four factors suggested by the Northern District of Illinois in Lax v. First
Merchant Acceptance Corp.55 are definitely relevant. They include: (1)
the number of shares purchased; (2) the number of net shares
purchased; (3) the total net funds expended by the plaintiffs during
the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered by the plain-
tiff.56 Other factors might include: (1) the volume of plaintiff's trade
in defendant's securities during the class period; (2) current level of
plaintiff's interest in the company; and (3) percentage of plaintiff's
investment in the security relative to the plaintiff's overall wealth.
57
c. Five Strikes and You're Out: Bar on Professional Plaintiffs
The Act also creates a bar for any person to serve as the lead
plaintiff in more than five securities class actions within any three-year
period, except as the court may otherwise permit.58 It is unclear
whether this provision of the Act can be applied retroactively to pre-
53 See In re Donnkenny, Inc. Securities Litigation, 171 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); see also, Malin v. IVAX Corp., Civ. A. No. 96-1843-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Oct.
31, 1996); In re 1996 Medaphis Corp. Securities Litigation, Civil Action No. 1:96-CV-
2088-FMH (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 1996); In re Vista 2000, Inc. Securities Litigation, Civ. A.
No. 1:96-CV-906-FMH (N.D. Ga. July 9, 1996).
54 See, e.g., In re Cephalon Securities Litigation, Civ. A. No. 96-CV-633, 1996 WL
515203 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1996); Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., Civ. A. No.
2:96cv03711 (JWB) (D.NJ. Nov. 8, 1996); In re Health Management, Inc. Litigation,
No. 96-CV-889 (ADS) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1996). But see In re Donnkenny, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 171 F.R.D. at 158 (denying request of several investors to be appointed co-
lead plaintiffs and stating: "To allow lawyers to designate unrelated plaintiffs as a
'group' and aggregate their financial stakes would allow and encourage lawyers to
direct litigation. Congress hoped that lead plaintiff would seek the lawyers, rather
than having the lawyers seek the lead plaintiff."); Ravens, supra note 27, at *22-23.
This approach seems to be in conflict with the text of the Act, though, as PSLRA
clearly contemplates appointment of a person or a group of persons as the most ade-
quate plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (I), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (I) (Supp. II
1996).
55 No. 97-C-2716, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12432 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997).
56 See id. at *17.
57 This factor is subjective and concentrates on the projected loss an investor
stands to suffer as a result of the fraud in relation to the investor's (individual or
institution) overall net worth. After all, the party that stands to lose the most as a
result of the fraud will represent the interests of the class (and itself) more vigorously
than a plaintiff that stands to lose only a negligible portion of its overall investments.
58 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (vi), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (vi) (Supp. 11 1996).
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Act conduct.59 If not, pre-December 22, 1995 involvement in securi-
ties class actions as lead plaintiff should not jeopardize one's chances
under the Act and the information regarding the pre-Act conduct
need not appear on the certification filed contemporaneously with
the complaint due to its irrelevance.
Moreover, prohibition to serve as the most adequate plaintiff
does not necessarily preclude one from initiating a lawsuit. Although
Congress intended the exception to the "five times in three years" rule
to apply only to institutional investors, 60 this intention is not suffi-
ciently "anchored" in the statutory text6 ' and thus it is possible that
courts might apply it to individual plaintiffs under certain limited cir-
cumstances. For example, where the only person to file the complaint
is someone who has already served as lead plaintiff in five securities
class actions over the period of three years and nobody else moves the
court to be appointed lead plaintiff, the court's refusal to award lead
plaintiff position to the only filer would raise serious due process ques-
tions. However, such a situation is not very likely to arise in practice.
3. Conclusion
Although the PSLRA has been successful in eliminating the race
to the courthouse, 62 it is unclear whether its lead plaintiff provisions
can claim much credit for this result. Other PSLRA clauses, particu-
larly the early certification, bar on discovery, and limitation attorney's
fees provisions might be equally responsible for such an outcome. On
the other hand, the lead plaintiff provisions contain too many uncer-
tainties and interpretive challenges, and have already caused unneces-
sary delays. 63 Moreover, considering the specifics of the securities
59 See generally Susan S. Gonic &Joseph D. Daley, The Non-Retroactivity of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 60 (1997) (arguing that the Act
should not apply retroactively).
60 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.CCA.N. 730,
734; see Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants
and Lauyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1049 (1996) ("[T]o limit professional plaintiffs' par-
ticipation in securities class action litigation, no person other than an institutional
investor may serve as lead plaintiff in a securities class action more than five times in
three years.").
61 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why The Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. L.w. 975, 975-76 (1996) ("The Supreme
Court has shown... that it will pay little attention to statements in legislative history
that are not 'anchored' to some provision in the statutory text.") (citing Shannon v.
United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994)).
62 See Savett, supra note 35; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
63 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 44.
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class actions, the value of the PSLRA lead plaintiff provisions to the
reform of the national class action scheme is limited. Under such cir-
cumstances, these provisions should not be used as a model for future
reform.
C. Knowledge Is Power: Disclosure of the Settlement to Class Members
1. Introduction
Prior to the Act, the terms of the settlement reached by the class
counsel often did not reach class members at all or reached them in a
very curtailed form. Consequently, the class members lacked mean-
ingful information to evaluate the settlement and to decide whether
to approve it, oppose it, or opt out of it altogether.64 Without suffi-
cient information to form a judgment about the merits of the settle-
ment, few members of the class objected to the settlement terms. This
system ensured that class counsel had a free hand in deciding when
and under what conditions to settle.65 The courts routinely approved
such settlements on the principle that "a bad settlement is almost al-
ways better than a good trial.
'66
To redress this problem, Congress has imposed a number of limi-
tations, including a restriction on filing the settlements under seal,67 a
requirement that a detailed settlement notice be provided to the
class, 68 and a provision encouraging the courts to exercise stricter
scrutiny in evaluating the award of attorney's fees under the settle-
ment terms. 69
2. Analysis
a. Limiting Parties' Ability to File Settlements Under Seal
Under the Act, a sealed settlement may be filed only if the court
allows it pursuant to a motion by a party. The movant has the burden
of demonstrating good cause for non-disclosure. Under the PSLRA,
in order to establish "good cause" a party has to prove that it would
suffer "direct and substantial harm" if the settlement terms or certain
provisions thereof are published.70 As the language of the Act indi-
cates, the sitting judge will have broad discretion in deciding whether
64 See Phillips & Miller, supra note 60, at 1050; Walker et al., supra note 32, at 645.
65 See Phillips & Miller, supra note 60, at 1050.
66 Walker, supra note 32, at 645-46 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 17).
67 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (5), 78u-4(a) (5) (Supp. I 1996).
68 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7), 78u-4(a) (7).
69 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (6), 78u-4(a) (6).
70 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (5), 78u-4(a) (5).
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to grant the motion, grant it in part while denying the rest, or deny it
altogether. The Act does not specify how the court is to measure
whether the potential harm is "direct" or "substantial.' It is also un-
clear whether the court can balance potential harm to a party against
the potential harm to the class that would inevitably result from the
lack of information about the settlement, or whether the inquiry
should stop at the showing of harm to a party.
b. Detailed Settlement Notice to the Class
Under the Act, members of the class have to be provided with the
settlement terms, including the amount of the settlement recovery in
the aggregate and on a per share basis,7 2 the statement of the poten-
tial outcome of the case, 73 the amount of fees and costs sought by class
counsel,74 identification of the lawyers' representatives who can an-
swer any questions related to the settlement terms,75 a brief statement
explaining why the parties are proposing the settlement,7 6 and such
other information as may be required by the court.7 7 When empow-
ered by the information contained in the settlement notice, class
members will be in a much better position to make an informed deci-
sion as to whether to oppose the settlement or a certain provision
thereof.
c. Approving the Settlement
Absent any objection from the class members, the court is very
likely to approve the settlement on the same considerations as before
the Act.7 8 Probably even more so now since the settlement notice dis-
closures ensure the class members' awareness and reduce the pressure
on the judge to act as a watchdog for the interests of the absent class
members. The court, of course, still has the discretion to reject or
modify the settlement.
At least some of the provisions of the settlement agreement, those
dealing with the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, are likely to
receive even more judicial scrutiny under the Act than before. The
Act limits attorneys' fees and costs to "a reasonable percentage of any
71 Id.
72 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7) (A), 78u-4(a) (7) (A).
73 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7) (B), 78u-4(a) (7) (B).
74 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7) (C), 78u-4(a) (7) (C).
75 See id. §§ 77z-1(a) (7) (D), 78u-4(a) (7) (D).
76 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7) (E), 78u-4(a) (7) (E).
77 See id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7) (F), 78u-4(a) (7) (F).
78 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
damages and prejudgement interest actually paid to the class. ' 79 It is
conceivable, then, that during a fairness hearing a judge, even in the
absence of any objection from the class members, may modify attor-
neys' fees provisions of the settlement.
The PSLRA provides no guidance as to what constitutes a "reason-
able percentage" of the damages and what is meant under the phrase
"actually paid' to the class.80 For example, how should a court deal
with the settlements that bestow non-pecuniary benefits on the class
members? Would the court have to deny any compensation to the
plaintiff's law firm where the class members recover very small or no
monetary damages? This interpretation appears manifestly unfair 8 l
and puts pressure on the attorneys to press for monetary damages in
the settlement negotiations at the expense of other alternatives poten-
tially beneficial to the class. If so construed, this provision invites vio-
lations of the ethical rules governing our profession.
3. Conclusion
Overall, the settlement provisions of the PSLRA are well designed
to serve the goal of providing more information to class members and
to terminate abuses by the plaintiff's law firms. They constitute a sig-
nificant improvement over the rules presently governing other kinds
of class actions.8 2 If the practical experience justifies the high expec-
tations of Congress regarding these provisions, legislators should seri-
ously consider expanding their application to all other class actions
brought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has brought
significant changes to securities class actions. It has already succeeded
in terminating the race to the courthouse8 3 and in encouraging so-
phisticated investors to volunteer to serve as lead plaintiffs.8 4 At the
79 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(6), 78u-4(a)(6).
80 Id. (emphasis added).
81 But seeJames D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARiz. L.
REV. 497, 518 (1997) ("The obvious thrust of [the fee restriction] provision is concern
that non-pecuniary settlements of dubious value to the class members are often the
expeditious route to the receipt of attorneys' fees. The Reform Act addresses this
concern by removing the settlement's non-pecuniary benefits from the scale in weigh-
ing the attorney's request for fees.").
82 Currently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not include any provisions
dealing with settlement of class actions.
83 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
84 See Savett, supra note 35, at 531-32.
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same time, it has brought new interpretive and practical challenges to
the courts, not the least of which is finding the balance between the
presumption in favor of uniformity in the federal judicial system and
the unique procedural rules applicable exclusively to the class actions
brought under the federal securities laws. How the courts deal with
these challenges remains to be seen.
Legislators should keep an eye on the judicial interpretations of
the Act and on the impact the Act's procedural changes have upon
the development of the securities class actions. Congress (or the
Supreme Court) should move with all deliberate speed to incorporate
provisions of the Act that prove useful and beneficial into the Federal
Rules in order to ensure 'just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of
controversies8 5 and to bring all federal class actions back into uni-
formity. Hopefully, the PSLRA is only a pilot program that will help
to make the whole of the class action scheme of the Federal Rules
more efficient. While far from being perfect, it is a bold and innova-
tive attempt at reform and should be applauded as such. Currently,
the ball is in the courts' hands, and they will have a decisive voice in
determining whether the PSLRA proves to be a success or a failure.
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85 See FED.R R CIv. P. 1.
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